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Abstract: 
This article examines whether the adjustment problems that follow job displacement become 
more severe as preseparation tenure increases. Recent research using nation- ally representative 
samples generally finds that the independent effect of seniority is quite weak and is dwarfed by 
other factors such as ethnicity, gender, or regional economic conditions. There is some evidence 
that persons with very high seniority (over 20 years) suffer larger wage losses than do other 
workers and that they might also be expected to lose pension benefits under defined benefit 
plans. The findings provide no justification for the Bureau of Labor Statistics's narrow definition 
of displaced workers, which includes only persons with more than three years' seniority on 
preseparation employment. 
 
Article: 
The combination of back-to-back recessions in the early eighties, rapid advances in 
manufacturing technology, and increased competition from imported products has led to layoffs 
and plant closings in many industries. Sustained high rates of unemployment have slowed the 
reabsorption of these displaced workers, heightened concern over their problems, and resulted in 
a number of programs being designed to assist them. For example, the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance Act (TAA) of 1974 and Title III of the 1982 Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) 
provide various forms of support for dislocated individuals including supplemental 
unemployment benefits, training, and reemployment assistance. These efforts are supplemented 
in some states by additional unemployment compensation, training assistance, or legislation 
mandating prior notification of plant closings. In addition, at the federal level, 1988 witnessed 
the passage of the omnibus trade bill, which authorized an almost threefold increase in federal 
retraining assistance for displaced workers, and of the first national legislation requiring 
mandatory advance notice of some involuntary job terminations. 
 
Implicit in these programs is a special concern for long-service workers who are expected to 
have the strongest attachments to their firms, largest postlayoff earnings losses, and greatest 
difficulties obtaining reemployment. The belief that adjustment problems increase with seniority 
is so prevalent that the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) excludes persons leaving jobs of less 
than three years' duration from their definition of displaced workers. Nonetheless, until recently, 
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there has been surprisingly little examination of how the costs of economic dislocation vary with 
job tenure. 
 
This article presents a brief summary of recent research examining postdisplacement adjustment 
patterns — with special attention paid to preseparation job duration. While this does not 
represent a complete review of the relevant literature and there are some differences across 
studies, three main findings emerge. First, the probability of suffering involuntary job loss 
declines dramatically with seniority. Second, once displaced, there is little evidence that 
joblessness or earnings reductions systematically increase with prior tenure. Third, the 
independent impact of seniority is dwarfed by factors such as ethnicity, regional economic 
conditions, and gender. Also, although the loss of fringe benefits may constitute a greater 
problem for high-seniority workers, existing research on this question is so limited as to provide 
little concrete information. 
 
DISPLACEMENT IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 
Virtually all workers now face the possibility of permanent layoffs at some point in their 
working lives. More than two million persons lost jobs annually between 1979 and 1986 as the 
result of plant closures or relocations, slack work, or a position or shift being abolished.
1
 Workers 
in manufacturing industries and blue-collar occupations account for a disproportionate share of 
the dislocated.
2
 Similarly, operators, fabricators, and laborers had a high relative incidence of 
displacement as did persons living in the heavily industrialized states of the Midwest and Middle 
Atlantic regions. 
 
Despite the disproportionate share of jobs lost in durable goods industries, blue-collar occupa- 
tions, and economically depressed localities, labor market dislocation occurs throughout the 
entire economy. For example, of the 5.1 million workers classified as displaced by Flaim and 
Sehgal between 1979 and 1983, one million were in the retail sales and service sectors, 1.9 
million departed managerial, professional, technical, administrative, or sales jobs, and 260,000 
terminated employment in the booming New England region.
3
 Given the widely dispersed 
incidence of displacement, the average seniority of employees in hard-hit sectors plays only a 
small role in determining whether low- or high-tenure workers are most vulnerable to economic 
dislocation. Much more important are the policies firms use in deciding which types of workers 
to release during cutbacks. In many cases, implicit or explicit policies dictate that layoffs will 
occur in inverse order of seniority.
4
 As a result, displacement probabilities decline steadily with 
seniority and the typical displaced worker is released from employment of fairly short duration.
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Given that long-tenure workers are much less likely to suffer economic dislocation than are 
individuals with lower seniority, special attention should be paid to their situation only if they 
experience much greater adjustment problems as a consequence of the displacement. The next 
three sections discuss whether this is the case. 
 
POSTDISPLACEMENT WAGE LOSSES 
Attachments to specific jobs are an important characteristic of the U.S. economy. More than half 
of the men between the ages of 40 and 55 will remain in their currently held job for 20 years or 
more, and 54% will hold a job lasting more than 20 years during some part of their working 
lives.
6
 A number of economic theories hypothesize that these worker-firm attachments lead to 
upward-sloping earnings profiles and that because the seniority premiums are tied to particular 
jobs, long-service workers are unlikely to retain their higher wages following labor 
displacement.
7
 Early research on dislocated workers appeared to support these predictions. For 
example, case studies and analysis of TAA recipients suggested that displaced long-tenure 
workers were reemployed at lower wages than are their counterparts leaving shorter-lasting jobs. 
Given their higher expected initial earnings, this was taken to imply much larger wage losses. 
 
Improved data on dislocated workers has led to a small explosion of empirical research studying 
postdisplacement adjustment patterns. This work substantially improves upon the earlier case 
studies and analyses that were limited to particular types of displaced individuals (such as TAA 
recipients) in that it uses nationally representative samples and attempts carefully to correct for a 
number of methodological problems that plague earlier research.
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The bulk of contemporary work suggests that high-tenure workers are less vulnerable, following 
displacement, than earlier theoretical and empirical studies predict. Abraham and Farber and 
Altonji and Shokotko argue that cross-sectional earning regressions overstate the returns to 
seniority by as much as 80%.
9
 This occurs because high-paying jobs last longer than lesser-paid 
employment and sorting therefore results in cross-sectional wage profiles that are steeper than 
true within-job earnings growth.
10
 Although these results are not conclusive, they suggest that 
the high wages of long-tenure workers may be transferable to postdisplacement employment. For 
example, if preseparation earnings are elevated because the individuals possess attributes that are 
valued across a wide variety of firms, there is no reason to expect them to suffer unusually large 
wage reductions following permanent layoffs. 
 
The evidence of disproportionate wage reductions for long-tenure job leavers is quite weak and 
these are probably restricted to individuals with extremely long job durations (i.e., over 20 
years). For example, Ruhm finds that while the relative wages of workers involuntarily 
terminating jobs of more than 10 years' duration decline by 7.3% (four years after displacement) 
compared to persons leaving jobs lasting less than three years, the corresponding reduction for 
nondisplaced individuals is an even larger 8.3%.
11
 This shows that failing to include a control 
group of nondislocated workers leads to an overestimate of the losses faced by displaced long-
tenure individuals because it does not account for the relative wage changes that would occur in 
the absence of the termination. Nonetheless, recent studies using samples that are restricted to 
displaced workers (and so suffer from this problem) show only a slight decline in relative wage 
growth as tenure increases. For example, Podgursky and Swaim find statistically insignificant 
tenure differentials for all displaced workers except blue-collar males, and even for this group, 
they estimate a fairly small loss — approximately 0.6% per additional year of tenure.
12 
 
It is also clear that a large portion of the returns to prior seniority are transferable to 
postdisplacement employment. For example, Kletzer uncovers a significant positive relationship 
between previous tenure and subsequent earnings and is generally unable to reject the possibility 
that all preseparation seniority premiums are transferred.
13
 Similarly, Ruhm actually finds larger 
seniority differentials in postdisplacement than predisplacement jobs for males with less than 20 
years' prior tenure.
14
 In contrast, tenure premiums are cut in half for the over-20-years group, 
suggesting that displacement is quite harmful for these senior workers.
15 
 
POSTDISPLACEMENT JOBLESSNESS 
Although relative wages typically fall following displacement, the dispersion of experiences is 
extremely large — approximately 40% of dislocated individuals increase their earnings.
16
 By 
contrast, almost all laid-off workers are jobless prior to obtaining new employment and, for the 
vast majority, the period is quite lengthy. For example, analysis of the Displaced Worker Surveys 
reveals that the median individual was out of work for 24.1 weeks prior to the 1984 survey, and 
for 18.3 weeks preceding the 1986 survey in the one to four years following displacement, with 
the duration of unemployment declining as economic conditions improve.
17
 These results under- 
state postlayoff joblessness because they include persons displaced shortly before the survey, 
whose unemployment spells have often not concluded by the survey date. Ruhm provides 
information on five-year employment histories for workers experiencing permanent layoffs in 
the early and middle seventies.
18
 He finds that displaced individuals average more than seven 
months of unemployment during the five-year period. Excluding the relatively small fraction 
(15%) who avoid unemployment altogether, the expected duration exceeds nine months. Adding 
in the time out of the labor force, total joblessness surpasses one year. 
 
Evidence that displacement is associated with significantly elevated joblessness does not imply 
special problems for persons leaving high-seniority jobs. It is commonly assumed that time out 
of work increases with prior tenure, but, again, the recent empirical evidence is far from 
compelling. The standard argument is (1) preseparation wages rise with seniority as firm-specific 
attachments are acquired, (2) reservation wages are an increasing function of previous earnings, 
(3) since seniority premiums will not be replicated on the new job, the difference between wage 
offers and reservation wages increases with seniority, (4) as a result, high-tenure workers remain 
unemployed longer — until their reservation wages fall to the point that they find an acceptable 
wage offer. 
 
This line of reasoning is questionable in several respects. As discussed above, it is unclear 
whether the seniority differentials observed in cross-sectional data result from firm-specific or 
generally applicable attributes and, therefore it is not obvious that long-tenure workers will be 
unable in replicate prior earnings in new employment. (The previous section indicates that, at 
least to some extent, they can.) Second, the relationship between predisplacement seniority and 
reservation wages is essentially unknown. Although reservation wages are positively correlated 
with prior earnings ceteris paribus, long-tenure workers probably have more family 
responsibilities, greater attachment to the labor force, and higher aversion to unemployment than 
their counterparts with less stable employment histories. Each of these factors mitigates against 
lengthy unemployment. 
 
Recent research suggests that the relationship between prior seniority and postdisplacement 
joblessness is quite weak. Addison and Portugal, Kletzer, and Podgursky and Swaim all find that 
tenure is associated with very small increases in male joblessness.
19
 For example, Addison and 
Portugal estimate that four additional years on the predisplacement job is associated with one 
extra day out of work. Other individual and economywide effects have much larger impacts, 
however. For instance, the racial (black/white) differential observed by Podgursky and Swaim is 
30 times as large as that from an extra year of tenure.
21 
 
The relationship between employment duration and subsequent joblessness is also highly 
nonlinear and definition-dependent. Ruhm finds that persons displaced from jobs lasting more 
than a year are unemployed three to six weeks longer than are those with shorter employment 
durations, but that there is no additional increase when additional seniority (beyond one year) is 
obtained.
20
 Furthermore, when time out of work is added in, total joblessness is actually longer 
for persons with less than a year's seniority than it is for those with greater tenure." 
 
FRINGE BENEFITS 
Because data on fringe benefits is so difficult to obtain, there has been scant examination of 
whether displacement leads to unusually large reductions of fringe benefits for long-tenure job 
leavers. One area of special concern is the loss of pension benefits among high-seniority workers 
who are covered by defined benefit pension plans.
22
 Retirement benefits in such schemes 
typically depend upon some combination of age, years of service, and highest earnings. 
Involuntary separations involving long-tenure workers may therefore cause large losses as 
accumulated years of service and (possibly) earnings are reduced. Ironically, because the 
actuarial accruals in most plans reach a maximum well before normal retirement ages, high-
seniority workers displaced in their early to middle fifties are likely to suffer greater pension 
losses than they would if terminations occurred at later ages.
23 
 
A second fringe benefit potentially affected by economic dislocation is health insurance. 
Interestingly, Horvath finds little evidence of lost benefits for dislocated workers who obtain 
reemployment but much lower rates of group coverage for unemployed workers and persons 
exiting the labor force.
24
 Losses of health insurance thus appear to be most problematic during 
periods of postdisplacement joblessness and any effect of prior seniority is likely to be far 
overshadowed by differences in labor force status. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The results suggest that current displaced-worker assistance policies are seriously misdirected. 
Although existing programs are rarely explicitly directed toward long-service workers, concern 
over such individuals is implicit in many cases. For example, it is frequently argued that 
agricultural and durable goods manufacturing industries need protection in the form of quotas, 
tariffs, and voluntary restraint agreements because they employ a high proportion of long-tenure 
workers for whom trade displacement is thought to be especially costly. The same groups most 
commonly have been eligible for TAA benefits and almost every argument for increasing 
assistance to displaced workers emphasizes the plight of persons leaving jobs of substantial 
duration. 
 
Programs narrowly focused on the most senior workers probably are justified. Fhe targeting, 
however, should be explicit and long tenure should be narrowly defined to include only those 
with 15 or more years on the preseparation job. Furthermore, lacking evidence that extended 
unemployment is a special problem for this group, programmatic support should be directed 
toward facilitating successful reemployment rather than providing extended unemployment 
benefits (beyond those available to other workers). 
 
Efforts to offset the large earnings losses of long-tenure job leavers may be called for. More 
generally, recent evidence indicates that postlayoff wage reductions are lasting while increased 
unemployment is largely transitory. This suggests that greater attention should be paid to the 
type of postdisplacement employment obtained, rather than considering the adjustment process 
to be completed (and successful) once unemployment ends. For example, workers with more 
than 20 years' tenure find new jobs relatively quickly but quite probably do so because they 
accept inferior positions to avoid an extended spell of joblessness. Unfortunately, current policy 
efforts tend to focus on the initial unemployment, rather than the much longer lasting wage 
losses. 
 
Involuntary job leavers average almost six months of unemployment in the two years following 
displacement and, as a result, frequently exhaust unemployment benefits. The provision of 
extended benefits to trade displaced workers may therefore be a "second best" measure designed 
to increase the duration of assistance available to at least a fraction of workers whose jobs 
permanently disappear. A better policy, however, would provide for broader-based supplemental 
assistance available to all permanently displaced individuals with prolonged joblessness. 
 
Ideally, the current UI and TAA systems should be redesigned to reduce existing adverse 
incentives while increasing benefits available to the most needy. One possibility would involve 
increasing the waiting period for payment of first benefits, raising the maximum number of 
weeks over which assistance could be received, and gradually reducing the size of the weekly 
benefit. This would simultaneously lower program costs by decreasing payments to the large 
number of workers with fairly short unemployment spells, increase assistance available to the 
longest-term unemployed, and improve incentives to search for new employment by raising the 
marginal cost of unemployment as benefits decline over time. 
 
Five of every six workers experience some joblessness following displacement. In addition to 
any earnings losses, the majority face a temporary lapse of health insurance benefits. This argues 
for government or employer provision of transitional group health coverage during the initial 
unemployment and possibly continuing for a limited period after reemployment. To reduce 
adverse incentives, the health insurance could be limited in scope (i.e., major medical only) and 
require contributions by the displaced worker on a means-tested basis. Even with such 
copayments, the program would be beneficial because of the savings in premium costs associated 
with group health plans. 
 
Increased economic dislocation has also made it more likely that workers will depart from jobs at 
which they have considerable accrued pension benefits.
25
 This suggests the need for increased 
portability of pension benefits. Although the ongoing shift from defined benefit to defined 
contribution plans will raise portability over time, the majority of currently covered workers are 
in defined benefit plans where portability is an important concern. 
 
Evidence of special problems for high-tenure workers is quite weak and probably limited to 
those with extremely long seniority (i.e., over 20 years). There are a number of other groups, 
however, for whom permanent job loss is especially harmful. Nonwhites and females have 
longer periods of postdisplacement joblessness and greater earnings reductions than do whites 
and males. Although it is probably undesirable to target programs exclusively toward women or 
minorities, policy efforts should take into account the special needs of these groups. Adjustment 
problems also appear to be more severe for workers displaced by plant closings than by partial 
layoffs and for those losing jobs in depressed regions or during recessions. Explicit targeting of 
assistance based upon these criteria may therefore be justified. Unfortunately, recent policy 
changes have reduced the support available to persons losing jobs in depressed local labor 
markets or during downturns.
26 
 
Despite the clear mandate for programs that assist displaced workers, our current understanding 
of the economic consequences of involuntary job loss is inadequate. One reason for this relative 
ignorance has been an excessive willingness to accept the "conventional wisdom" without testing 
its accuracy. For example, the BLS restricts their definition of displacement to persons losing 
jobs of more than three years' duration. This exclusion criteria is justified only if adjustment 
problems increase with tenure and three years represents a meaningful cutoff point. The evidence 
presented here suggests potential inaccuracies in both assumptions and argues for the use of 
broader definitions of displacement. The exclusion of short-tenure individuals is particularly 
unfortunate given evidence that persons leaving jobs of more than three years' duration face the 
prospect of repeated turnover and associated prolonged unemployment if the economy slackens 
following the initial separation. Because they have left lengthy jobs in the recent past, these 
workers have short current tenure and so are excluded from the BLS definition of displaced 
individuals. 
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